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ABSTRACT 
 Cases of ransomware within local government agencies have become 
prevalent over the last decade.  While solutions to ransomware are available, 
local government agencies are slow to implement such measures.  As a result, 
local government agencies are among the most famous victims of ransomware.  
This project attempts to provide an answer for ransomware prevention within 
these agencies from a public policy perspective.  To formulate this answer, the 
issues local governments face in combating ransomware are compared to the 
solutions implemented in the private sector.  This project then analyzes the 
mechanisms local governments have at their disposal to implement such 
solutions through the public policy analysis process and provides a hypothetical 
policy agencies can use to combat ransomware.  Finally, a real-world case study 
provides a context of what solutions local governments have implemented and 
where these agencies are falling short.  This project found that policies focused 
on ransomware and cybersecurity at large are not being developed nor 
implemented within local government agencies. It is recommended that local 
government agencies should consider developing and implementing specific 
policies to combat ransomware and other cybersecurity crimes.      
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
Malware attacks against government agencies have occurred since the 
inception of the internet.  In the past, most of these attacks were based on two 
primary, but different objectives.  One was the extraction of sensitive data for the 
personal gain of the hacker who extracted the data.  The other was a hacker who 
was not looking for personal gain, but instead, was looking to disrupt the 
operations of the government by shutting down their computer networks through 
a denial of service (DoS) attack.   However, cyber-attacks have evolved, and 
hackers began using a different mechanism to infiltrate networks.  This new type 
of malware both disrupted services and led to financial gain – ransomware. 
 In the case of ransomware, an attacker captures a private network, locks 
down the access or encrypts the data, and only allows the owner to regain 
access through compensation.  Because of the potential significant impact of 
ransomware, the spread of these attacks has become prevalent.  Ransomware 
attacks have grown 200% since 2014 (Zamora, 2019).  Additionally, ransomware 
is not biased to a particular type of business or agency.  Every institution from 
small businesses and nonprofits to large healthcare companies have fallen prey 
to ransomware.  Of these attacks, ransomware attacks against government 
agencies have grown exceptionally, only second to small businesses.  
Ransomware attacks against local government agencies are uniquely 
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troublesome due to the type of sensitive data these agencies contain and the 
impact it imposes on citizens.   
  Ransomware attacks against local government agencies present issues 
that begin in their information technology infrastructure.  It is common for many 
local agencies to face dilemmas in funding their information technology 
departments.  Even more alarming is the fact that they lack the resources to keep 
the infrastructure they do have up to date. Many chief information officers find 
themselves parsing scarce resources while sacrificing best practices.  Often, 
information technology professionals inside of local governments discard 
cybersecurity mechanisms and methods for other more traditional infrastructure 
needs.  However, the current demand for defending government networks 
against ransomware attacks cannot be ignored.  In 2019 alone, 55 local 
government agencies inside of the United States were victims of ransomware 
attacks, totaling millions of dollars in damage (Freed, 2019).  Ransomware 
attacks against these agencies potentially have severe consequences as these 
agencies provide essential services that many constituents depend on every day.  
Preventing local governments from operating through ransomware has the 
potential to have negative life-changing effects on many people. 
Problem Statement 
 
 
This project analyzes best cybersecurity practices and mechanisms within 
the private sector and government agencies in order to provide a solution for 
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local governments to combat ransomware. The focus will be on the following 
questions: 
● What are known best practices for combating ransomware attacks within 
the private sector that local government agencies can utilize? 
● What are the challenges for implementing such best practices in local 
governments within the United States? 
● What are the specific practical solutions available to help local 
governments combat ransomware attacks? 
● What resources can local governments utilize from other aspects of 
government operations to assist in developing a ransomware prevention 
policy? 
 This project will first establish the correlation between the information 
technology challenges of local government agencies and their targeting as 
victims of ransomware attacks.  Many local governments within the United States 
face significant information technology (IT) challenges.  These challenges include 
a lack of good IT based infrastructure and the inability to attract skilled 
employees due to inefficiencies in pay.  Additionally, a local government's IT 
infrastructure is very diverse as these governments perform an array of services 
to citizens (Evangelakos, 2019). These issues directly relate to why government 
agencies are being victims of ransomware.   Data from a survey at the national 
level will provide a context of the challenges local governments are facing.  This 
project focuses on the mechanisms, resources, and tools local governments 
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have at their disposal to prevent ransomware, and provides a public policy 
analysis perspective to develop a policy that effectively combats ransomware 
that meets or surpasses that of the private sector.  Private sector solutions are 
analyzed to discover resources local governments can implement within their 
agencies.  After this analysis, market-based policies local governments can 
utilize, such as franchising and public-private partnerships, will provide 
contracting mechanisms to assist in implementing a ransomware policy.   Public 
sector financial analysis tools and educational platforms, such as performance-
based budgeting, are utilized with market-based solutions, to develop 
performance measures that will be the foundation of this new ransomware 
prevention policy. Finally, the project includes a logic model that demonstrates 
the needs, outcomes, expectations of this policy. The logical model establishes 
key performance indicators (KPI's) to ensure ongoing policy success.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
RANSOMWARE 
 
History of Ransomware 
 
 
The genesis of ransomware is modest at best.  The first known attack was 
poorly coded and used essential confidence defrauding techniques to infect 
victim's computers.  Yet, the first known case was very poignant by providing 
inspiration for future attacks.  In 1989, a large number of delegates of the World 
Health Organization Aids Conference fell victim to the first known ransomware 
attack.  Weeks prior to the conference, these delegates were sent floppy disks 
with the instruction that these floppy disks contained information about the 
upcoming conference in Stockholm, Sweden.  In actuality, these disks had a 
Trojan horse that dispersed a worm in the user's MS-DOS based PC.  After the 
initial infection, the worm would replicate itself each time the PC was turned on 
and the 90th time, the PC became locked.  The locked-down of the user's PC 
was very reminiscent of modern-day ransomware attacks.  This attack would 
become known as the AIDS Trojan attack.  Upon the lockdown of their PCs, 
users were shown a lockdown screen stating that their PC "lease had expired," 
and payment of $189 was to be made to a lockbox in Panama City.  Again, not 
that all different from the attacks we experience today.  This attack did have one 
fundamental flaw; the code was generic, resulting in poor encryption.  Security 
professionals were able to decrypt the code quickly, which resulted in very few 
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people paying the ransom.  Nevertheless, the attacker succeeded in planting the 
seeds of ransomware for future generations.   
  After the Aids Trojan attack, ransomware nearly went dormant for the next 
decade.  It was not until 2003 that a prominent ransomware attack appeared.  
The 2000s was the height of peer-to-peer file-sharing programs.  Millions of files 
during this period were shared through these platforms, which provided a perfect 
resource for the deployment of ransomware attacks.  In these cases, hackers 
would embed code in the files being shared, very commonly MP3 or MP4 based 
files, which, once downloaded, would infect the victim's computer with a form of 
ransomware.  Since these file-sharing platforms were technically illegal, attackers 
would alert the user that they had been caught illegally sharing proprietary music, 
videos, and software.  The message would state that the user was required to 
pay a fine to avoid imprisonment.  This technique is not very different from the 
false debt collection phone calls scams during the 1980s, only in digital form.  
These attacks proved successful, as many of the victims would wire the money 
or use a credit card to pay the so-called fine (Palmer, 2019).  It is essential to 
emphasize the simplicity of many early ransomware attacks.   Many cases were 
merely extensions of previous mail and phone-based scams that used 
intimidation and threats to seize money from victims.  However, initial 
ransomware attacks were, in fact, successful, and provided the crucial 
groundwork for future attacks.  This inspiration has led to the modern-day 
ransomware attack – attacks that are more devastating and costlier to its victims. 
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Ransomware Methodology 
 
 
Popular file-sharing programs of the 2000s mainly drove ransomware 
attacks.  These incidents became the baseline for the modern-day ransomware 
attacks, and cybercriminals took notice.  Since 2010, several current based 
ransomware events began to occur.  Similar to previous events, these attacks 
use social engineering to infiltrate the user's computer, typically through email 
phishing or false links embedded into webpages.  Modern ransomware attacks 
are classified into two distinct methods on how they infect a computer or network.  
One is a direct download rootkit-based method.  Most commonly, the malware is 
disguised as an email attachment.   This rootkit based attack, in most cases, 
hides within the operating system.  Once rooted in the operating system, the 
ransomware program triggers after a sequence of events; usually the number of 
times the computer is booted, or an application is launched such as Microsoft 
Outlook.  It is important to note that ransomware behaves differently than other 
rootkit malware.  Rather than wanting to hide itself to remain undetectable, 
ransomware intends to make its presence known.  Once deployed, the 
ransomware program encrypts the user's data or locks access to the computer.  
The user is then prompted for payment in order to regain access. 
  The other form of modern ransomware is a communication-based bug.  
Rather than embedding the ransomware program in a user's operating system, 
the malicious link instead starts communication to a landing page for an exploit 
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kit (Johnson, 2016).  The server the exploit kit is on starts retrieving information 
about the software versions the victim is running and identifies vulnerabilities.   
The malicious program will scan for an unpatched or outdated version of the 
operating system or other embedded software to identify a way to penetrate the 
user's computer or network.  After the vulnerability is identified, the server pushes 
down the malicious program.  At this point, this method essentially becomes a 
rootkit and hides itself and its trail within the operating system.   The result is the 
encryption of the user's data and demand for payment to restore access. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Ransomware Process 
 
 
 
The behavior of ransomware can be classified into three categories: 
locker, crypto, and hybrid (Ahmed et al. 2019).   Locker, as the name suggests, 
locks the entire device at large.  In the case of these types of attacks, the data 
files on the victim's computer or network are not modified as this type of 
ransomware specifically blocks access functionality.  Crypto methods infect and 
encrypt specific files on a computer or network rather than the entire device.  
Crypto attacks target specific files typically through the asymmetric encryption 
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process by denying the user access to the public key (Ahmed, et al, 2019).  
Hybrid-method based attacks combine aspects from both crypto and locker by 
encrypting target data and locking access.  This type of attack has become 
particularly troublesome for IoT devices connected to networks as it can 
compromise both backend and front end based devices (Ahmed, et al, 2019).   
There is, however, a fundamental and significant difference between the crypto 
and blocker methods of ransomware.  Blocker methodologies, in many instances, 
can be reversed by reloading a computer's operating system. In most cases, the 
files on a computer have been backed up, and simply restoring the operating 
system can regain access to these files.  In contrast, crypto and hybrid methods 
specifically encrypt files, thereby making them impossible to recover without the 
key.   
Ransomware Current State 
 
 
Ransomware, like other forms of malware, are not static within their 
programming and function.  Several strains of modern ransomware have taken 
prominence over the last decade and these strains continue to evolve based on 
newly discovered vulnerabilities in an array of software and firmware.  One could 
argue that the most prolific and impactful strain of ransomware ever created was 
Wannacry.  The Wannacry outbreak began in May of 2017, where several 
European countries fell victim to this network-based attack.  Within the Windows 
server message block (SMB) protocol, the protocol that allows for the sharing of 
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files and other data on Windows-based PCs and servers, a group of grey hat 
hackers from the National Security Agency found a vulnerability known now as 
Eternalblue (Jones, 2017).  The basic premise of the Enternalblue exposure is 
the ability for a potential hacker to inject a shell      within the communication 
during SMB communications.  This action allows for the malicious Wannacry 
code to affect a PC or server.  Wannacry, contrary to initial beliefs, was not 
spread by malicious email or other social engineering techniques, but rather by a 
piece of poorly written code within a commonly used protocol.  Unknown sources 
leaked the discovery of Enternalblue to a group known as the Shadow Brokers, 
who then dumped the exploit across the internet.  The first case of Wannacry 
occurred just two weeks after this dump (Jones, 2017).  The SMB exploit that 
allowed the Wannacry pandemic to occur was based on old code that was 
patched by Microsoft months before the vulnerability was publicly known.  
Wannacry was only successful against PCs and servers that were not up to date 
on security patches.  Several European local governments were behind on their 
network patching (Jones, 2017).  All governments, from small special districts to 
large state governments, should use the Wannacry case study as a fundamental 
reason to maintain all software updates security patches.   
  Wannacry, however, is certainly not the only strain of ransomware to 
affect local governments.  In fact, inside of the United States, Wannacry was not 
prevalent among government agencies (Jones, 2017).  Nevertheless, other 
strains were very successful in penetrating government agencies.  Another 
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popular type of ransomware was the SamSam bug that took advantage of 
vulnerabilities within the JBoss servers' open-source platform.  In March of 2018, 
employees of the City of Atlanta started to notice that certain public-facing 
applications were experiencing outages.  Public web portals, such as an 
application for citizens to pay their water bills, was suddenly unavailable.  One by 
one, outward and eventually inbound facing applications starting to go offline.  
The applications instead prompted a message asking for Bitcoin payment for the 
City of Atlanta to regain access to their files and applications.  The City of Atlanta 
had become a victim to relative old nemesis in terms of ransomware, the 
SamSam bug (Hoffman, 2018).  By March 2018, the SamSam bug had, in fact, 
already infected numerous local governments, including the Port of San Diego 
and the State of Colorado.   In total, SamSam is responsible for effecting over 50 
governments within the United States (Hoffman, 2018).  SamSam utilizes a 
vulnerability within JBoss servers' remote desktop access functionality.  This 
vulnerability was discovered in 2015, and patching for the vulnerability was made 
a short time after.  However, many local governments failed to comply with 
updating their servers, which made them prime potential victims for SamSam.    
In the many cases of SamSam infecting local governments, many were unable to 
maintain their security patching primarily due to their lack of information-based 
technology resources (Hoffman, 2018).   
  Both SamSam and Wanancry, along with numerous other ransomware 
strains, infect computers and networks based on software vulnerabilities, typically 
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due to outdated versions of the software.  However, new forms of ransomware 
enhance the method in which it infects a computer or network.  This form of 
ransomware brings the vulnerability to the system allowing the ransomware to 
infect.  This strain of ransomware is known as Robbinhood.  Robbinhoom is 
considered by many network security experts to be the most devastating form of 
ransomware in use (Brandt, Loman, 2020).  Robbinhood is clever, before 
penetrating a network, it delivers a driver for a commonly used motherboard for 
Windows-based products, both PCs and servers.  This authentic and digitally 
signed driver is recognized by the Windows operating system, which then installs 
the driver.  Once installed, the PC or server is now open to the Robbinhood 
attack, an attack that has devastated many local governments.  The City of 
Baltimore fell victim to the Robbinhood bug in May of 2019.  In this case, the 
attacker asked for $80,000 in Bitcoin in order to obtain the encryption keys.  City 
Officials refused, and the attackers were not paid.  However, the City of 
Baltimore has spent more than $18 million in remediation costs, and most data 
was not recovered (Sussman, 2019).  It is important to emphasize that his 
particular attack was not because of a lack of IT-based resources that resulted in 
outdated systems with vulnerabilities.  This attack was possibly due to the City 
not having adequate personnel versed in cybersecurity or a cybersecurity team.  
This lack of talent within local governments is common (Freed, 2019).  A 
cybersecurity professional within the City of Baltimore, one could argue, more 
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than likely could have potentially prevented this attack or at least mitigating a 
substantial amount of the damage. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RANSOMWARE CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
 
Local Government Challenges 
 
 
Many local government agencies face challenges in combating all types of 
malware, including ransomware.  However, it would be misclassification to state 
that local governments have not utilized practices and policies to prevent these 
threats.  Current policies and procedures include concepts that range from 
technological infrastructure to employee education programs. Furthermore, local 
governments in the past have received support from higher governments. The 
Federal government has been guiding local governments in the area of 
cybersecurity, which included ransomware prevention since 2012 (Richardson, 
North, 2017).    Therefore, it is evident that many agencies have implemented 
policies to combat ransomware, but many, if not most, fall short of the need 
(Norris, Mateczun, Joshi, Finin, 2018).  To convey this fact, most information 
technology leaders within local governments find the current policies and 
procedures are in drastic need of improvements (Richardson, North, 2017).    
It should be emphasized that cybersecurity demands are very fluid, and as 
a result, many local government agencies fail to keep up.  These agencies face 
significant obstacles to properly secure resources and implement policies that 
meet the dynamic needs of ransomware prevention.  These obstacles, as 
provided by Richardson and North (2017), include: 
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1. Inability to staff cybersecurity and information assurance professionals 
due to inefficiencies in pay. 
2. Lack of funding for new information technology infrastructure, which 
leads out of date technology. 
3. The diversity of the support that Information Technology professionals 
must provide to government 
4. The enforcement of policy and practices. 
The above obstacles have led to many challenges in combating all types 
of malware for local governments, including ransomware.  While there are a large 
number of challenges currently affecting local governments, we will focus on 
three significant challenges that the policy solution will address.  It should be 
noted, data from the National Association of State Information Officers (NASCIO) 
cybersecurity survey provided contextual data for these challenges.  This survey 
is released on a bi-annual basis to information technology professionals from 
SLED (state, local, educational, special) government agencies within the United 
States and asks specific questions in terms of the current cybersecurity issues 
these agencies are facing.  This survey was last issued in mid-year, 2018, and a 
summary of the data will be provided in Appendix (B). 
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Challenge 1: Budgetary Control 
All local agencies, including school districts, are mandated to budget using 
line item methodologies (Shah, 2013). The primary motivation behind a line item 
based budget is to give the same amount of weight or consideration to each 
expenditure.  The idea being that each expense should be objectively analyzed 
to determine which have the most considerable impact to the budget.  There are 
additional internal control and risk management advantages to line-item 
budgeting.  Government agencies are allocated a specific amount for each 
expense and cannot exceed this amount, which is legally approved by their 
elected body.  From an accounting and financial standpoint, line-item budgeting 
reduces risk compared to other budgeting methodologies, which is why all 
government agencies within the United States utilize line-item budgeting (Shah, 
2013).  There are, however, drawbacks to line-item based budgeting.  First, this 
process is, in fact, very bureaucratic and time-consuming.   Line item budgets are 
allocated on an annual basis, which results in a typical budget preparation cycle 
of 6 months (Shah, 2013).  The budget preparation cycle results in the 
competition of expenditures and expenditures being collated together.   
In terms of information technology expenditures, including policies and 
infrastructure, line-item budgeting requires that information technology leaders 
justify each level of expense to their elected bodies, which often results in 
information technology leaders commingling their costs together (Caruson, 
MacManus, McPhee 2012).  As an example, cybersecurity needs could be 
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combined with other network-based expenses resulting in funds needed for 
cybersecurity being used for different requirements such as new switches or 
network storage devices.  The solution to this is simple yet challenging to 
implement.  Make cybersecurity-related expenses an actual item on the budget.  
By doing so, all money allocated to that line item must be an expense for 
cybersecurity needs.   By having this legally mandated funding, cybersecurity-
related policies such as ransomware prevention would have the needed funding.  
This challenge alone is a fundamental reason why local governments face 
serious cybersecurity challenges (Caruson et al., 2012).  According to the 
NASCIO survey (2018), only 2 percent of local governments’ budgets contain 
cybersecurity line items.  A probable reason for this is bureaucracy, while the 
chief information security officer is advocating for cybersecurity needs, the 
network manager is advocating for network needs (Caruson et al., 2012).  The 
policy solution presented in this paper looks to address this issue.  
Challenge 2: Acquiring Cybersecurity Talent 
  The acquisition of cybersecurity talent presents two interesting issues to 
local government agencies.  The first is the local government’s financial 
capabilities to hire information and cybersecurity professionals.  The other is a 
local government’s competence to outsource their cybersecurity needs to 
companies who can provide these services.  Both issues result in local 
governments not having the human capital to combat all types of cybersecurity 
issues, including ransomware. 
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  The attraction, employment, and retention of information and cybersecurity 
professionals present an interesting problem for local government agencies.  Most, 
if not at all, cannot offer potential employees' salaries that compete with the private 
sector (Norris et al., 2018).  This lack of funding begins at the budgetary issues 
discussed earlier.  When information security policies and programs are not 
funded directly through a line item expenditure, they cannot request specific 
positions for those programs (Caruson et al., 2012).  Furthermore, the high-level 
salaries offered in the private sector are something that is just not feasible for 
many public agencies.   When discussing this issue, it is important to note how 
most local governments are funded – through direct sales tax and special revenue 
fees.  Direct sales tax and special revenue fees are highly susceptible to economic 
trends (Shah, 2013).  Meaning, when there is a downturn in the economy, these 
agencies are significantly impacted.  Due to this, most local government agencies 
do not have revenue streams that are consistent enough to offer large level 
salaries. 
  The other prominent issue in acquiring cybersecurity talent relates to 
contracting and outsourcing.  It is common for small level agencies, defined as 
having 100 employees or fewer, to outsource most of their information technology 
needs (Caruson et al., 2012).  Since many agencies do not directly fund a 
cybersecurity program in their budget, we again find that this scenario leads to a 
competition for priorities.  Most agencies contract with a "lump sum" vendor who 
provides an array of services, which may or may not include cybersecurity 
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(Caruson et al., 2012).  Additionally, many of these agencies have issues in their 
contracting processes, which is also a budgetary issue.  When an agency does not 
directly fund their procurement programs, they do not have the resources to 
procure services adequately (Kamensky, Morales, 2013).  As a result, these 
agencies do not use the mechanisms and tools they have at their disposal.  These 
tools include competitive sourcing and public, private partnerships.  These tools 
will be utilized in the policy solution proposed in this paper.  This issue is 
additionally conveyed in the 2018 NAISCO survey.  Only 38% of local government 
agencies used outsourcing mechanisms.    
Challenge 3: Cybersecurity Education of Employees 
  In most cases, ransomware infection begins through a malicious download 
attached to an email or through a corrupted link.  Typically, this is the result of 
some social engineering where the user follows the link or downloads the 
attachment with good intentions.   For local government agencies, this means 
employee actions are the genesis of ransomware infections.  Unlike other forms of 
malware, ransomware is a direct result of an employee not appropriately behaving 
while on the agency's network. Different types of malware, such as a Trojan horse 
base rootkit, are the result of a hacker deliberately trying to infiltrate private 
networks through circumventing firewalls and other security-based hardware. 
Local government agencies must implement educational programs so that 
employees know how to recognize potential ransomware attacks.  However, many 
local government agencies have not implemented such measures, and those that 
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have been implemented often fail to fully impact the entire organization (Caruson 
et al., 2012).    
   Internal employee training needs are essentially divided into two 
categories, preventing the intrusion from actually occurring and what actions need 
to be taken if a breach occurs.  Local government agencies are falling short in both 
of these areas.  Both Caruson et al. (2012) and the NAISCO survey (2018) 
indicate that less than half of local government agencies have implemented 
cybersecurity based education to its employees.  The NAISCO survey (2018) and 
Norris, et al. (2018) provides additional insight into the type of training being 
implemented at these agencies.   Of the training being provided, 78% of agencies 
piece their cybersecurity training together.  In these cases, the type of attack is not 
differentiated or what to do when a breach occurs.  This lumping of training is likely 
the significant reason why this training is ineffective; it is merely trying to cover too 
much information (Norris et al, 2018). 
  It should be emphasized that ransomware is a unique type of malware that 
can be prevented mainly by employee actions.  As such, local government 
agencies need to develop training that is not only effective but also incentive-
based.  While cybersecurity training is mandatory in most cases, employees are 
typically not tested, nor are incentivized to learn the material (Norris et al, 2018).  
Additionally, the NAISCO survey (2018) indicates that only about 28% of agencies 
include risk assessment and response training, meaning that employees are not 
given the entire scope of cybersecurity.   To resolve these issues, a local 
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government agency’s cybersecurity training, including ransomware prevention, 
must be all-inclusive and have mechanisms for employees actually to learn the 
material.  The proposed policy solution will provide solutions to these issues. 
Ransomware Solutions  
 
 
 Local government agencies do have specific barriers in combating all 
types of malware, including ransomware.  However, when analyzing the impact 
of ransomware against local government agencies, it is essential to emphasize 
solutions that do exist.  The private sector provides these solutions.  According to 
Richardson and North (2017), three solutions to ransomware prevention are 
proven mechanisms in the private sector.  These solutions include the backing 
up of all data by a standard like that of the private sector,   the avoidance of 
emails with embedded links and attachments, and ensuring that operating 
systems and all related software remain up to date.  Each of the solutions directly 
relates to the ransomware infection methods previously discussed.  Additionally, 
Evangelakos (2019) expands these areas to include practices that treat each 
incoming attachment, as it could be a potential attack.  It is vital to understand 
each of these areas when developing a ransomware prevention policy.    
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Data Backup 
 
 The first line of defense against a potent ransomware attack is the backing 
up of sensitive and crucial data.  If IT professionals consistently back up their 
data, then there would not be a reason to pay the ransom during a ransomware 
attack (Richardson, North, 2017).   Local governments, as part of their standard 
networking policies, do typically implement back up procedures.  In most 
instances, these backup policies include redundancies to ensure more than one 
back up in the case of data loss.  It is a common practice for these backups to 
remain on the internal network utilizing RAID and SAN devices, which means 
that the data backup is still on the network (Richardson, North, 2017).  In some 
cases, ransomware encrypts the entire internal network meaning that data 
recovery is impossible.   Further, Caruson et al. (2012) found that many local 
agencies do not back up their data frequently enough.     Local government 
agencies should strive for data backup policies that replicate private sector 
practices.  Finally, these agencies should procure infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS) for the backing up of crucial data in a cloud environment (Evangelakos, 
2019).   
Avoidance of Emails with Embedded Links and Attachments 
 As previously stated, email phishing and social engineering-based attacks 
are the most common method for ransomware infections.  In the case of local 
government agencies, this infection is a direct result of an employee downloading 
a corrupted attachment or following a malicious link delivered by a hacker via an 
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email.  Additionally, ransomware attacks have occurred within local governments 
when a user that is not an employee follows a malicious link (Norris et al., 2018).  
Commonly, this happens when a user accesses the internet from a public 
computer on the agencies’ network, such as at a library. These two infection 
methods require solutions that are both educational and technology-based.  
Again, the private sector provides mechanisms for these solutions.  We know 
that many local government agencies face significant challenges in providing 
meaningful and impactful cybersecurity education.  This is primarily because 
these programs are not incentive-based at these agencies.  The educational 
policies of local governments are in exact contrast to what occurs within the 
private sector.  It is common for many private companies, especially large-scale 
companies, to capture highly sensitive data and incentivize employees in 
cybersecurity education (Richardson, North, 2017).  These incentives are not 
purely monetary based. Instead, they are instruments that provide employees 
with certifications that assist them with internal promotions within the company or 
allow them to take extra leave time.  It should be noted that these programs test 
the employees in training to determine their competence level.  This practice 
does not occur within the public sector (Caruson et al., 2012).  While the 
cybersecurity training is mandatory in many instances within local governments, 
this training typically does not have a testing component.  The other solution is 
technologically based.  This solution includes the implementation of intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) that are 
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configured to detect and prevent emails with malicious attachments and links.  
This solution requires two main components.  One is the equipment itself, which 
is a challenge for many local governments.  As the NASCIO (2018) survey points 
out, cybersecurity only accounts for 3% of local agencies' budgets.  The other 
component is the personnel to implement and manage the IDS's and IPS's.  
These highly skilled personnel require a significant level of pay.  Many private 
sector businesses outsource this service, and local governments should utilize 
this approach as well.  The method for the local agencies to do so is covered in 
the policy solution presented in this paper.    
Frequent Patching of All Operating Systems  
 Ransomware’s modus operandi is to penetrate a network through a flaw 
or vulnerability of an operating system or software.  This method is by far the 
most prevalent for ransomware infections.  In many cases, this vulnerability is 
known, and the software developer has released security patching.  
Ransomware hackers are constantly analyzing when well-known software 
companies release security patching and then footprint for networks that fail to 
deploy this patch (Ahmed et al, 2019).  Therefore, there is a valid argument that 
the most massive deterrent to ransomware is keeping all essential software up to 
date.  It also seems like a simple solution and one that is easy to implement.  
However, as previously discussed, local government agencies are failing to keep 
operating systems or other valuable software up to date.  Our first inclination for 
this issue comes from the NASCIO survey (2018), which found that almost 50% 
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of local governments are understaffed in their information technology 
departments. 
  Further, this understaffing of cybersecurity personnel is not a recent trend.  
Caruson et al. in 2012 concluded that the majority of local government agencies 
were understaffed.  Meaning, the workforce does not exist to keep vital software 
up to date within these agencies’ networks.  Moreover, underfunded information 
technology departments often mean that cybersecurity programs are nonexistent.  
Similar to the education challenge previously discussed, this issue is in exact 
contrast to what occurs within private-sector practices.  Private sector practices 
to prevent ransomware include an information assurance policy that guarantees 
the frequent patching of all software (Richardson, North, 2017).  In instances 
where internal cybersecurity personnel do not exist within the organization, it is 
common to outsource these services.  Local government agencies need to utilize 
mechanisms, such as outsourcing, to ensure that information assurance 
practices are in place, which guarantees frequent patching. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
Public Policy Analysis Process 
 
 
 This project has covered ransomware and why local government agencies 
are vulnerable to these types of attacks. The project additionally covered known 
ransomware solutions and the challenges in implementing these solutions.  The 
intent now is to develop a policy that local governments can utilize in combating 
ransomware.  Before creating the policy, the public policy analysis process 
should be explained to show how the context of the policy will solve this issue. 
There are three fundamental principles of the public policy process, which are 
identifying the problem, the instrument used in the policy to correct the problem, 
and the overall goal of the policy.  If you know these three things, then you 
understand the policy.  Of course, the actual public policy process is quite 
complicated and is incremental to implement.  When designing and implementing 
public policy, a policy analyst will follow five steps to ensure the policy's success.  
Each step is crucial to the development of a ransomware prevention policy.   
Step 1: Problem Definition 
 Problem definition is the most critical step in the public policy process.  
This step must include the entire depth of the problem definition, which will then 
shape the actual response.  If a policy analyst fails to define the problem 
adequately, the policy will likely fail (Heineman, Bluhm, Peterson, Kearny, 2011).  
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It is essential at this step to also understand what the problem is in the realm of 
public policy.  Hoppe (2018) defines a public policy problem as a discrepancy 
between a real-world situation and the desired outcome.  As an example, in 
identifying the poverty problem, the real-world situation is the millions of 
Americans living in poverty, and the desired outcome are these people being 
given the tools to overcome poverty.  The discrepancies, in this case, are the 
numerous reasons why people are living in poverty.  Once the problem has been 
identified, the next step starts with a few basic questions about the problem.  
These include, when does the problem occur, who does it affect,  why is it 
occurring, and where is it happening? It is crucial to point out that these 
fundamental questions become very complex, meaning the answers to these 
questions usually lead to other problems.  In using the example of poverty again 
and answering: “why does it occur?”      It      can be argued that the lack of 
education can lead to poverty. So defining the problem of poverty has also 
become a problem with education.  This process is known as problem 
"clustering."  This process is expected in the public sector because most 
problems that the government is trying to solve are involved, meaning that one 
problem is usually the result of other problems. This issue is solved by issuing 
framing, which is the process of identifying all viable stakeholders, origins, and 
costs of the problem (Hoppe, 2018).  The process of issue framing begins with 
problem clustering, and if done well, it will lead an analyst to all known sources 
within a problem. 
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Step 2: Instrument Design and Analyst 
 Once the problem has been adequately defined, the next step for the 
analyst is deciding how to solve the problem by designing the instrument.  
Typically, policy analysts design instruments based on the desired outcomes, 
which are usually based on altering or changing a behavior, changing economic, 
political, or social conditions or providing a service (Hoppe, 2018).  In this regard, 
policy instruments are based on what governments have the power to do.  Peters 
(2016) finds that governments usually base their policies on a direct provision, 
tax, subsidy, regulation, and authority.  Typically, most public policies include one 
or more of these types of actions. As an example, a ransomware prevention 
policy may consist of a new information assurance regulation as well as a new 
tax to fund the policy. At this step, the policy analyst examines the well-defined 
problem and chooses the action to take by selecting the government's authority 
and the desired outcome.  This step is all about choosing the correct instrument.  
The problem in this regard will shape the instrument, and the policy analyst must 
consider the instrument's outcome.  As an example, a regulation requiring 
businesses to donate a portion of their profits to help combat poverty would not 
be an excellent instrument to use as this could entice businesses to leave the 
government’s jurisdiction, but offering tax subsidies to companies to donate to 
charity will probably entice businesses to do so.  
 The issue at this stage of the public policy process is based on intended 
outcomes. The solution to this issue is instrument analysis. This is important 
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because some instruments may have negative outcomes.  Peters (2016) 
stresses that a policy analyst must analyze all possible instruments to determine 
all possible results at this stage.  It is also essential for the analyst to look at 
similar policies and instruments that have been implemented in other 
governments to determine possible outcomes.   
Step 3: Policy Network and Communication 
 Once the policy instrument has been decided, the next step is about 
assigning the new policy roles and developing a policy network.  A policy network 
is about identifying all actors who will have a role in the implementation and have 
a stake in the new policy.  This stage is not about assigning responsibilities and 
tasks but instead identifying actors who will play a part in this policy.  Identifying 
the actors involved will help the analyst design a strategy that will assist in the 
next step of the implementation process.  This stage is also about 
communicating the policy and why the problem the policy is trying to solve needs 
to be solved.  An analyst at this stage must be transparent and have clear and 
concise facts about the policy and the problem.  Again, correctly defining the 
problem plays a significant role.   The issue at this stage is not communicating 
the policy vividly, which may cause the policy to not be supported.  It is also 
important to remember that most public policies will have actors in different 
governments who will play a role in the policy.  A way to address this problem is 
to develop a policy argument and agenda-setting.   
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Step 4: Implementation 
 At this stage, the policy analyst has now defined the problem completely, 
chosen the instrument to solve the problem, analyzed all alternatives for other 
instruments, and has developed a policy network.  It is now time to implement the 
policy. Implementation of the policy is about assigning objectives to all of the 
roles identified in the policy network.  The key to implementation is ensuring that 
all positions involved have an understanding of how the policy is going to be 
implemented. Peters (2016) points out three criteria needed for policy 
implementation, adequate time to implement, specific objectives, and agreed 
upon tasks for each role.  Essentially the policy analyst must develop a clear and 
concise implementation strategy that is understood and agreed by all parties 
involved.  The lack of this strategy is where the issue occurs at this stage. The 
most used form of the implementation strategy is forward mapping.  Forward 
mapping begins by stating the precise goal of the policy.  As an example, "it is 
the intent of this policy to combat hunger within our community by providing food 
to local food banks."  The process of forward mapping then assigns roles based 
on specificity. 
Step 5: Evaluation 
 The final step of policy analysis is evaluating the implemented policy.  At 
this stage, the policy analyst looks at all outcomes of the policy to determine 
success.  In doing this, all inputs to the policy are compared to the outputs to 
develop performance measures.  These measures give key performance 
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indicators to how well the policy is performing.  In the case of the ransomware 
prevention policy presented in this project, all inputs and outputs will be 
developed into a logic model to demonstrate the desired outcomes and 
performance measures.    
Policy Solution 
 
 Having examined the challenges local governments face in preventing 
ransomware and private sector solutions, we can now apply public policy 
analysis to develop a policy that is achievable by many local agencies.  In doing 
so, this project will take each step of the policy analysis process previously 
discussed and apply local government mechanisms to achieve this goal.  The 
first step of this process is properly defining the problem of how ransomware 
affects local governments and how implementing prevention is problematic in 
many agencies.  It is essential in this step to identify all relevant stakeholders and 
how this policy may affect them.  We will then use this problem definition to 
design instruments to assist in the mitigation of ransomware and a 
communication plan to all stakeholders.  Finally, the project will provide 
implementation and evaluation, including a logic model. 
Problem Definition 
  On the surface, ransomware appears to be a straightforward problem.  A 
hacker deploys a nasty bug that encrypts files or lockdowns access to a PC or 
network. However, as discussed, ransomware presents serious complications for 
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local government agencies.  These complications must be a part of our problem 
definition.  First, ransomware has severe implications for local governments due 
to the possible services the attack could disrupt.  Ransomware attacks in the 
private sector may disrupt their day-to-day operations for a financial services 
company, as an example, without having life-changing implications.  However, 
this is hardly the case for local agencies.  In many of these cases, local 
government agencies provide vital lifesaving services that range from law 
enforcement to emergency medical services.  Ransomware shutting down these 
types of services has the potential to affect lives negatively. 
 Further, local agencies lack the resources to respond adequately to      
ransomware attacks.  It takes longer for a local agency to respond than in the 
private sector.  Finally, ransomware attacks against local government agencies 
have full implications for their financial position.  Look no further than the City of 
Atlanta, who spent over $60 million in migrating their attack and still did not 
recover any of the data (Lohrmann, 2019). 
 Local governments face issues in ransomware prevention due to 
inadequate funding for cybersecurity, which leads to the inability to attract staff 
and improper education programs.  By defining both the implications and 
challenges of ransomware, the public policy process provides us with 
stakeholders.  Defining the stakeholders allows us to design instruments to solve 
the problem.  Notice that the list below is more of a grouping of stakeholders 
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based on their relationship to this problem.  Additionally, it is common for these 
stakeholders to overlap: 
Stakeholders 
●  Taxpayers within the government's jurisdiction 
● Government employees who utilize the IT infrastructure 
● Elected officials  
●  IT professional within the local government  
● Taxpayers and constituents who depend on government services 
● Property owners within the agencies’ jurisdiction 
● Business owners within the agencies’ jurisdiction 
 
Instrument Design 
 This project covered three fundamental reasons why local government 
agencies have experienced issues with ransomware - lack of budgetary control, 
acquiring cybersecurity talent, and educating employees. The policy solution will 
contain instruments to combat these issues.  First, the lack of budgetary control 
feeds the other two issues.  Acquiring cybersecurity talent and educating 
employees is a result of a lapse in funding.  We cannot combat these issues until 
we address the lack of funding.  Our first instrument in this policy will be to 
introduce a cybersecurity program based on a performance-based budget.   This 
process will guarantee the funds needed in areas such as acquiring 
cybersecurity talent and educating employees. 
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 Performance budgeting, as described by Bland (2014), is a budgeting 
process that measures the actual performance of the line item expenditure and 
bases the allocation amount on this performance.  The performance-based 
budgeting method accomplishes this by analyzing the goals and objectives and 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes (Bland, 2014).  If a program is budgeted at the line 
item level through a performance-based budgeting methodology, the money 
allocated must be used for its specific goals.  A ransomware prevention policy 
with a performance-based budget would then have an allocation that could only 
be used for items such as acquiring cybersecurity talent and educating 
employees. 
 It should be noted that there are drawbacks to performance-based 
budgeting. Using this type of budgeting method guarantees that the program is 
under constant scrutiny.  Under a performance-based budget, the inputs, as well 
as the outputs, are continually being analyzed.  Meaning if the outcome of the 
program does not meet its goals, then the inputs, such as funding, could be cut.  
Further, performance-based budgeting is tedious and requires constant analysis, 
which is why many agencies only utilize this practice for specific programs rather 
than the entire budget (Bland, 2014).  However, to acquire funds for a 
ransomware prevention policy, performance-based budgeting is a mechanism 
that guarantees that allocating money will be spent on this policy. 
  Allocating funds for the policy now allows us to introduce instruments for 
the actual prevention of ransomware. In terms of acquiring cybersecurity talent, 
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many local agencies need to come to a harsh truth – they cannot afford full-time 
cybersecurity positions. Most of these agencies’ revenue streams, as discussed, 
are simply too volatile to take on the long term costs of these positions.  As a 
result, agencies have one option, outsourcing. Fortunately, local agencies have 
mechanisms to assist them in this process - public, private partnerships, and 
franchising.   To understand the context of how these mechanisms will work in 
this policy, we will need to use a hypothetical agency.  In this regard, we will use 
a fictional city, City A, to illustrate the utilization of public-private partnerships and 
franchising.  City A is experiencing the issues we have previously discussed, 
including an uneven revenue stream and dilemmas in implementing 
cybersecurity solutions.  
 Public-private partnerships are programs that allow both a government 
agency and a private company to share the cost of a program while both 
receiving benefits (Kamensky et al., 2012).  A public, private partnership allows a 
public agency to contract with a private sector organization to provide a service 
or product to the agency.  In return, the private sector organization receives 
some incentive to do business with the public agency.  Incentives in this regard 
come in all shapes and sizes and range from sharing revenues with the agency 
to tax benefits. Our public-private partnership for the ransomware prevention 
policy will first outsource the needed requirements.  The requirements, in this 
case, are classified into two categories, infrastructure, and personnel.  We know 
from our private sector solutions that the backing up of data and frequent 
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patching off all relevant systems are two crucial elements in ransomware 
prevention.  Fortunately, we can classify these needs into service for the sake of 
our public-private partnership that captures each of these aspects.  Our policy 
solution will mandate the contracting of data backups to an offsite cloud location 
and the patching of all relevant software by an outside company. In addition, this 
company will analyze the status of our network infrastructure, including firewalls, 
to determine their status and if a replacement is needed.  This company will then 
provide all hardware and implement the hardware. Finally, our policy will 
mandate a minimum contract period of five years.   This is a large project that will 
require a private sector company to be in the vicinity of City A.  However, this 
directly relates to how we will incentivize a company to provide these services 
through franchising these services to other agencies.  Franchising in the public 
sector is when one agency offers services to another local agency (Kamensky et 
al, 2012).  We know that City A will have to pay for these services. However, we 
also know like many local agencies, City A cannot afford the total long-term 
costs.  To combat this, City A will establish franchise contracts with other local 
agencies for the private sector company to provide the same services.  Other 
local agencies, as we know, are facing the same issues in combating 
ransomware.    In the case of our ransomware prevention policy, this franchising 
mechanism will spread the cost to several agencies instead of one, thereby 
lowering the overall cost.   
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 Data backup and patching of operating systems is only one part of the 
private sector solution.  The other part, as we know, relates to the cybersecurity 
education of employees. For this solution, we will also rely on public-private 
partnerships, but instead of collaborating with a private company, we will look at 
another valuable resource, higher education.  Cybersecurity is becoming a very 
popular major.  In 2018, cybersecurity was the most prevalent degree colleges 
added to their majors (Busta, 2018).  Local agencies should address this in their 
ransomware solutions. The NAISCO survey (2018) listed partnerships with 
higher education as a fundamental solution for local agencies' cybersecurity 
needs.  For our ransomware prevention policy, City A will collaborate with 
surrounding universities offering cybersecurity as a major to develop training for 
employees.  The incentive in this case for the university is the real-world 
experience it can offer its students.    
 The other issue with education, as we know, deals with incentivizing 
employees to learn the material in a cybersecurity class.  To combat this issue, 
we can implement a strategy that has proven successful in a few agencies. This 
strategy has only been implemented on a small scale.   A small number of 
agencies now require employees to take cybersecurity training and pass a test, 
and when they do so, they are offered paid time off (PTO) for passing the test 
(Parnofiello, 2019).  This incentive of paid time off is a simple solution public 
agencies can implement at a low cost to help ensure employees are learning the 
material.     
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Policy Communication 
 With our instruments defined, we can now begin to communicate the 
policy to appropriate stakeholders.  This policy will require approval from City A's 
elected body for our public-private partnerships and their corresponding 
contracts.  This approval includes the addition of our performance-based budget 
to the City’s overall budget, which will guarantee funding and the City's 
permission to solicit for the partnerships.  In this case, we will solicit using a 
request for proposal (RFP), which obligates our contracted private-sector 
provider as well as our education partner to standard contract language.  Once 
adopted by the elected body, a policy manager will be assigned.  This manager 
will be tasked with identifying all relevant actors and communicating the policy to 
them.  It is important to note that policy communication is frequently ongoing 
throughout the life of the policy, and the policy manager will reach out to all 
prospective agencies regarding our franchising instrument.  
       Policy Implementation 
 For the implementation of our policy, the policy manager will enact a 
forward mapping process.  In this case, we must identify the overall goal of our 
policy and the inputs through our instruments that will achieve this goal.  The 
overall goal of this policy, as we know, is ransomware prevention.  Additionally, 
we know the inputs from our instrument design.  Note that the inputs are not just 
the instruments themselves but also the mechanisms we need to implement and 
support those instruments: 
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● Partnerships with a private firm to provide cybersecurity support 
● Partnership with an educational institution for educational support 
● Request for proposals (RFP’s) 
● Management of Public-Private Partnerships 
● Policy Manager 
● Performance-Based Budget 
● Paid Time Off Programs 
● Education Platforms for Cybersecurity Training 
With our inputs defined, the policy manager can now implement the policy 
through the establishment of steps: 
1. Develop a Performance-Based Budget with Performance Measures 
2. Submit Performance-Based Budget for Approval 
3. Develop RFP’s  
4. Award RFP’s and Finalize Contracts 
5. Contracted Private Sector Vendor Provides Cybersecurity Support  
6. Contracted Educational Institution Provides Education Platforms 
7. Develop Franchise Contracts with Other Agencies 
8. Testing of Employees for Cybersecurity Awareness 
 
These steps are high-level, and there are many sub-steps for each of the top-
level steps.  However, these steps and inputs layout an overall map of how to 
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implement such a policy.  Further, the inputs and steps provide a foundation for 
the final stage of our policy solution – evaluation. 
Policy evaluation 
 The evaluation of this policy will involve establishing performance 
measures and comparing all inputs and outputs to desired outcomes. We will 
select three performance measures for ransomware prevention policy: 
1. 60% of all employees achieve a passing score on their cybersecurity 
training exam 
2. Data backups will occur every 24 hour 
3. All software will be patched within one week of manufacture, releasing the 
patch.  
Performance measure 1 and 2 will require the establishment of the data that 
requires backing up, and what software is deemed crucial to require patching.  The 
policy will require the development of a logic model to evaluate the outcomes of 
the policy's performance with the required inputs.  This logic model will provide a 
success rate by comparing the outcomes of the logic model with our established 
performance measures.  Frechtling (2007) defines a logic model as a tool that is 
utilized to describe the change and impact of a project or policy.  In the case of our 
ransomware prevention policy, a logic model compares all of the required inputs, 
the activities of those inputs, the outputs of those activities, and the overall 
outcomes to determine the policy's success.   A logic model sample of our 
ransomware prevention policy is provided in Appendix (A). 
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CHAPTER FIVE                                                                                                   
CASE STUDY - COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
 
 We have developed a hypothetical policy to combat ransomware within 
local government agencies by analyzing private sector solutions and the public 
policy process. This theoretical policy utilized tools such as public-private 
partnerships and performance-based budgeting to implement measures in 
ransomware prevention, including software patching and educational programs 
to employees.  This project will now examine how a real, local government 
agency is implementing solutions to combat ransomware and the challenges the 
agency is facing in implementing these solutions.  These solutions and 
challenges will directly relate to the solution and challenges previously presented 
in this project.  This project will focus on the problem questions given at the 
beginning of this project: 
● What are the challenges for implementing such best practices in local 
governments within the United States? 
● What are the specific practical solutions available to help local 
governments combat ransomware attacks? 
● What resources can local governments utilize from other aspects of 
government operations to assist in developing a ransomware prevention 
policy? 
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 For our real-world agency, this project will examine the County of San 
Bernardino, who shares similarities to our hypothetical city utilized in our policy 
solution.  The County of San Bernardino is the largest geographical agency in the 
agency in the United States.  As a result, this county government provides an 
array of services to a very diverse population and must provide these services to 
geographical locations that vary from deserts to mountains.  The County of San 
Bernardino currently employees over 22,000 employees, and most employees 
have network and internet access to accomplish their everyday tasks.  The 
County of San Bernardino has had a curious financial history, including a severe 
budget gap of $46 million in 2011 and submitting balanced budgets for the last 
three fiscal years (CAP Review, 2019).  Of particular interest is the fact that the 
County of San Bernardino has not fallen prey to a ransomware attack.  However, 
this does not mean that ransomware attacks have not occurred within San 
Bernardino County.  In October of 2019, hackers infected the San Bernardino 
City Unified School District with ransomware that resulted in the loss of internal 
employee email capabilities (De Atley, 2019).   In 2018, the County launched a 
cybersecurity division within its Information Services Department and hired a 
chief security officer to oversee the division.  While the County has implemented 
measures to combat ransomware and other cybersecurity issues, they also face 
challenges in tackling these issues, each of which is discussed in our case study. 
What are the challenges San Bernardino County is facing in implementing such 
best practices? 
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 The County of San Bernardino is currently experiencing a fundamental 
issue implementing a full-scale cybersecurity policy that fulfills all of the best 
practices from our private sector solutions.  We know from our previous analysis, 
budgetary problems are the catalyst for other problems in implementing 
cybersecurity solutions within local government agencies. Of particular concern is 
a volatile revenue that results in inconsistency in an agency's revenue stream. 
The County of San Bernardino is not immune to this issue.  First, let us examine 
the County's projected financial position over the next five fiscal years.  Chief 
Executive Officer Gary McBride presented the image below from a financial 
position presentation to County Board of Supervisors on May 5, 2020: 
 
 
Figure 2. County of San Bernardino Projected 5 Year Budget 
http://cms.sbcounty.gov/cao-finance/Budget.aspx 
Notice that there is a five-year budget deficit of $82.3 million as projected by the  
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County Administrative Office.  This deficit is primarily due to an expected decline 
in revenue. This deficit additionally means that the County of San Bernardino will 
face challenges in obligated long-term funds for full-time positions to combat 
ransomware and other cybersecurity measures. This issue, as we know, is a 
prevalent problem among local government agencies.  The County also faces 
problems in allocated funds that are committed to cybersecurity.  While the 
County has implemented a cybersecurity program, at a budgetary level, they do 
not have specific line items allocated to cybersecurity expenses. The image 
below was taken from the County of San Bernardino 2019-2020 adopted budget: 
 
 
 
Figure 3. County of San Bernardino 2019-2020 Adopted Budget 
http://cms.sbcounty.gov/cao-finance/Budget.aspx 
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Of particular interest is the Information Services Department does not have a 
budgetary unit dedicated to information assurance or cybersecurity. Instead, 
these operations are lumped together with other department initiatives.  As 
previously discussed, this often results in competition between department 
objectives and can lead to the underfunding of specific actions, like 
cybersecurity. 
Recommended Action:  The County of San Bernardino should implement a 
performance-based budget for cybersecurity activities.  This action will assist in 
ensuring direct funding for these initiatives.  Additionally, given the number of 
cities within San Bernardino County, the County should explore franchising their 
cybersecurity services once established.  
What resources can the County utilize from other aspects of their operations to 
assist in developing a ransomware prevention policy? 
 The County of San Bernardino, like many other local government 
agencies, faces issues in allocating direct funds for cybersecurity programs.  
Additionally, there are other aspects of private-sector solutions the County can 
utilize in combating ransomware.  From the County's current budget position, we 
know that obligating the long term costs of cybersecurity is an issue and will 
continue to be so over the next five fiscal years.  As previously discussed, a 
solution to this issue is to outsource cybersecurity services to an outside 
company.  Of particular importance, is the routinely backing up of data to ensure 
data recovery in the case of ransomware.   The County of San Bernardino is not 
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currently utilizing this solution to outsource its data backup initiatives.  However, 
this service was, in fact, outsourced      previously to a private sector entity.  An 
examination of the County's electronic procurement system reveals that the 
County contracted for this service in 2015: 
 
 
Figure 4. Related Solicitations (RFP’s) to Information Assurance and 
Cybersecurity https://epro.sbcounty.gov/bso/ 
 
 
It is important to note that the County bid out these contracts in 2016 with a 
three-year contract period, meaning that the County does not have a current 
contract.  It is assumed that these services are now provided "in-house," which 
could mean that the County is not fully utilizing data backups to the best of their 
abilities.  In this regard, the County is maybe falling short of best practice used in 
the private sector.  However, this is not to say the County has not implemented 
measures in outsourcing their cybersecurity needs.  In 2017, the County did 
execute a contract for outsourcing some of their IT reeled needs, including 
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Business Systems Analysts who could assist in information assurance and 
cybersecurity needs. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Current IT Staffing Contract https://epro.sbcounty.gov/bso/ 
 
 
 
Recommended Action: Given the County's current financial position, which 
does not account for the current COVID19 pandemic expenses, the County 
should utilize      additional outsourcing mechanisms to reduce costs, as 
suggested in this project’s policy solution.  
What are the practical solutions available to help the County of San Bernardino 
combat ransomware attacks? 
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 As previously mentioned, the County initiated an information security 
strategic plan in 2018. Their information security plan is fundamental in 
establishing a baseline to secure cybersecurity-related activities within the 
County.  Further, this plan included measures to increase information assurance, 
such as identifying and classifying data, enabling data backup protocols, 
establishing risk assessments, and implementing monitoring tools.  Below, is a 
roadmap of the County's information security plan: 
 
Figure 6.  County of San Bernardino Information Security Roadmap 
http://cms.sbcounty.gov/cao-finance/Budget.aspx 
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The County's information security plan and roadmap are comprehensive, 
including many of the solutions proposed in this project.  However, what is 
important is how the County will implement many of these objectives.  Our case 
study has revealed that the County is not currently outsourcing many of these 
activities, and the County will face a substantial budget deficit over the next five 
years.  For the County to implement many of the objectives listed on their 
information security roadmap, they must overcome these issues.  To do so, the 
County must adopt measures and procedures that will introduce policies that 
guarantee the implementation of ransomware prevention and cybersecurity as a 
whole. 
Recommended Action: To see their information security plan come to fruition 
over the next five years, the County must utilize innovative measures as 
discussed in this project to ensure they are implemented.  These include the 
adoption of a performance-based budget for cybersecurity-related activities and 
the use of the public, private partnerships. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 This project proposed a question of why local government agencies face 
issues in preventing ransomware from a public policy perspective.  This project 
explored the history and functionality of ransomware.  In its earliest form, 
ransomware was a modest issue in terms of the damage it could impose.  
However, over the last several decades, ransomware has evolved and has given 
hackers the capabilities to fully lock down networks and prevent government 
agencies from accessing crucial data.  Once locked down, the hacker can then 
hold the data for ransom and prevent local governments from providing services.   
 Due to the potential profits, ransomware has become a very prominent 
form of malware, particularly for local government agencies.  As this project 
explored, these agencies face significant challenges in not only preventing 
ransomware, but also all areas of cybersecurity. These challenges begin with the 
mandated budgeting processes local government agencies utilize.  These 
budgeting limitations lead to deficiencies in IT infrastructure, obtaining cyber 
security-based personnel, and employee education programs.  Each of these 
elements provides solutions that prevent ransomware. Additionally, as suggested 
by this project, local government agencies should implement ransomware and 
other cybersecurity solutions that exist in the private sector. 
 While ransomware solutions do exist and are successful in the private 
sector, local government agencies have failed to implement many of these 
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solutions.  The primary reason why these agencies have not been able to do so 
is their lack of implementing policies and mechanisms that guarantee 
ransomware prevention solutions come to fruition. This project analyzed the 
fundamental steps of the public policy process to provide requirements of how a 
local government agency could design such a policy.  Further, the project 
provided a hypothetical policy that included solutions from the private sector and 
the tools local government agencies have at their disposal to implement such a 
policy. 
 Finally, a case of the County of San Bernardino demonstrated that while 
local government agencies have partially implemented private sector solutions, 
many are failing to implement a comprehensive policy-based solution.  As stated 
previously, local governments must implement policies that are specific to 
ransomware.  Failing to have these particular policies leads to a competition of 
resources, which results in resources being allocated elsewhere within the 
government agency.  These policies must include funding and contacting 
mechanisms to provide the needed resources, which will secure policy success.  
  Ransomware in the future will evolve.  Hackers will discover new 
vulnerabilities and will continue to target government agencies as well as private 
sector entities. Local government agencies have no choice but to develop a 
means to prevent these attacks. These agencies have a unique challenge in 
implementing such measures compared to their private-sector counterparts.  A 
private company can buy and then implement a solution.  In contrast, a 
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government agency must follow statutes and policies to implement solutions and 
overcome the challenges discussed in this project.  Ransomware prevention and 
cybersecurity must be policy-based as it promises long-term and committed 
solutions to these problems.    
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APPENDIX B 
NAISCO 2018 CYBERSECURITY SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 
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